Proper procedure for a commercial aircraft to take-off from a given runway includes as a first step the selection or an initiation of take-off flaps. Referring to FIG. 1, a prior art wing assembly 10 includes a wing body 11. Attached to the wing body 11 is a slat 13 and a flap assembly 15. The flap assembly 15 includes a first flap 15A, a second flap 15B, and a third flap 15C are designatively extended from the wing body 11 upon take-off. By extending the slat 13 and the flap assembly 15, the pilot increases the surface area of the wing assembly 10 while enhancing the curvature or chord of the upper wing surface to greatly enhance the lift generated as the wing assembly 10 passes through the air. The enhanced lift generated by the extension of the slat 13 and the flap assembly 15 enables the heavily ladened aircraft to take-off from the runway.
Failure to extend the flap assembly 15 and, where available, the slat 13 may have catastrophic consequences as in the 5 Sep. 2005 take-off accident at Medan, Indonesia when a B-737 aircraft failed to generate suitable lift on take-off due to the failure to extend the slat 13 and the flap assembly 15. The pilot, after entering the runway, had not set the flaps for take-off. Once the pilot had noticed the flaps, the aircraft was already “at speed.” Lacking sufficient lift, the aircraft crashed shortly after takeoff. No aircraft malfunction was noted.
What is needed, then, in the art are systems and methods for generating an enunciated warning when the flap assembly 15 is not extended before take-off from a runway.